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I. INTRODUCTION 
The value-glamour effect is one of the most striking findings in the empirical finance 
literature. It is consistently documented that value stocks, which are those with high 
fundamental-to-price ratios, such as book-to-market ratio (BM hereafter), earning-price ratio 
and cash flows yields etc., outperform their lower ratios counterparts, known as glamour 
stocks (Fama and French, 1992, 1998; Lakonishok et al., 1994; Gregory et al., 2001). The 
strong evidence from the academic literature has inspired the widespread style-oriented 
investment strategies implemented by the investment community in the last few decades. 
However, despite the strong (weak) performance of value (glamour) portfolios, many value 
(glamour) stocks do not over-perform (under-perform) (e.g. Piotroski, 2000; Bird and 
Casavecchia, 2007). Thus, it is important to identify investment strategies that can recognise 
the better performing stocks in value and glamour portfolios as implied by simple value 
measures, such as the fundamental-to-price ratios.  
In response to this need, one recent strand of literature employs fundamental analysis 
models to try improving the performance of value – glamour investing. The evidence is 
striking. Piotroski (2000) measures the overall firm’s strength with a composite score, 
namely the F Score, that cumulates nine individual fundamental signals covering many 
aspects of the firm’s past performance, including profitability, liquidity, capital structure, 
sources of funding and operating efficiency. Piotroski finds that, among high BM value 
stocks in the US during the period between 1976 and 1996, those with higher F Score tend 
to outperform their lower F Score counterparts by as much as 23% per year, and such 
outperformance persists for at least two years after the financial statements are released. In 
a similar vein, Mohanram (2005 ) designs a G Score from eight fundamental signals and 
finds that this measure of financial strength can differentiate winners from losers among low 
BM glamour stocks in the US stock market during the 1979-1999 period.  Subsequently, Bird 
and Casavecchia (2007) use a dynamic model based on 24 accounting variables to predict 
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the probability of a stock having an improved earnings-per-share performance, and they 
employ that probability as a measure of financial strength. Bird and Casavecchia’s evidence 
is consistent with Piotroski’s and Mohanram’s conclusions that fundamental analysis can 
help differentiate “good” from “bad” value and glamour stocks. Needless to say, such 
evidence has important practical implications for investors, especially those using style-
oriented investment strategies. 
The evidence accumulated in the context of value-glamour investing and fundamental 
analysis, however, suffers from a major weakness related to the lack of understanding about 
the drivers of the observed return patterns. Most of the research in this area (Piotroski, 2000; 
Mohanram, 2005; Bird and Casavecchia, 2007) defines excess returns against a 
benchmark, such as the market portfolio or the corresponding size deciles. Bird and 
Casavecchia (2007) also find evidence that the Fama and French three-factor model cannot 
explain the observed returns. Although the debate is far from being settled, the cumulative 
evidence seems to reject risk-based explanations and suggests instead that behavioural 
biases may be responsible for the observed return pattern. In this context, the paper aims at 
making inroads into further explaining the source of the observed excess returns.  
Following Ball (1992 ), who argues that the rejection of the efficient market hypothesis 
should emerge from the inability to reject a plausible inefficiency hypothesis, the paper 
makes a significant contribution to the understanding of the issues discussed above by 
offering a well-defined framework of investor’s biased behaviour as an alternative 
hypothesis. In the extant literature, when the risk-based explanation is rejected, the value 
premium is often attributed to investor’s over-reaction, while the abnormal returns from 
trading strategies based on fundamental analysis are claimed to be the result of investor’s 
under-reaction. The question of how over-reaction can be reconciled to under-reaction in the 
context of value–glamour investing and fundamental analysis cannot be ignored. Thus the 
paper aims at contributing to the literature by addressing the following question: why do 
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investors over-react to the future prospects of value and glamour firms and, at the same 
time, under-react to financial information about these same firms? 
The paper hypothesises that the observed returns on portfolios formed on the bases of 
both value measures and fundamental analysis may be explained by behavioural biases. 
From a psychological viewpoint, value investors could potentially behave differently from 
glamour investors because value investors are typically pessimistic about the firm’s future 
prospects, whereas glamour investors are on average optimistic. The literature on   
psychological biases in economic behaviour presents strong evidence of confirmation bias 
(e.g. Rabin and Schrag, 1999) and argues that people tend to misinterpret new information 
to support their prior beliefs. In this context thus, pessimistic value investors can be expected 
to be more biased when processing good information, and optimistic glamour investors to be 
more biased when processing bad information. The literature on value–glamour investing 
and fundamental analysis reviewed above provides further motivation for a test of investor’s 
confirmation bias. Piotroski (2000) shows that, among value stocks, a hedge portfolio with a 
long position in financially strong stocks and short in weak stocks earns on average returns 
of 23% per annum, and these strong returns result mainly from the long position in financially 
strong stocks (13.4%). On the contrary, among glamour stocks, Mohanram (2005) shows 
that the contribution of a short position in financially weak stocks to the annual returns on the 
hedge portfolio dominates (17.9% out of 21.2%). Those observations suggest that, among 
value (glamour) stocks, those that are financially stronger (weaker) are more severely 
mispriced. A similar observation also derives from Bird and Casavecchia (2007). Overall, the 
cumulative intuition is that the pattern may follow a “rule”, which is consistent with investor’s 
behaviour suffering from a confirmation bias.  
The paper provides a direct test of the confirmation bias by bringing together the 
evidence from several strands of literature into a well-defined framework of investor 
behaviour. More specifically, the paper tests the empirical predictions of the confirmation 
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bias by applying Piotroski’s (2000) and Moharam’s (2005) models across sub-samples of 
value and glamour stocks, and by analysing whether value investors are most severely 
biased when they receive good financial information and glamour investors when bad 
information arrive. Piotroski’s and Mohanram’s models are originally tailored for and applied 
only among either value or glamour stocks. Both models concentrate on recent financial 
information and are constructed in a similar way by transforming financial signals into binary 
scores. Thus, applying them outside their designated contexts, simultaneously to both 
glamour and value stocks, can enhance the strength and robustness of the analysis and 
generate additional insights. 
The paper contributes to the literature in at least three important ways. First and 
foremost, it is the first study to provide evidence of investor’s confirmation bias in relation to 
the use of financial information in pricing value and glamour stocks. Not only such evidence 
has important practical implications for investors, but it also contributes a well-defined 
behavioural framework to the existing literature on fundamental analysis models applied to 
value–glamour investing. Second, the paper provides additional evidence on the 
determinants of abnormal returns from value-glamour investment strategies. Third, the 
evidence that both Piotroski’s F Score and Mohanram’s G Score perform indistinguishably 
well outside their designated contexts provides an additional reason to criticise the reliance 
on stock’s styles when developing contextual fundamental analysis models. The strength of 
the evidence presented in the paper arises mainly from two sources. First, the paper argues 
that the methodology applied here is more appropriate than the methodologies used by the 
extant literature, given the well-documented problems associated with statistical tests on 
long-term buy-and-hold abnormal returns (Kothari and Warner, 1997; and Barber and Lyon, 
1997). Specifically, the paper adopts Barber and Lyon’s (1997) approach and uses control 
firms matched on book-to-market ratio and size to adjust returns for risk. This approach has 
been shown to be more appropriate for examining long-term abnormal returns. In addition, 
bootstrap procedures are also employed to reinforce the evidence obtained from the 
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traditional parametric tests. Second, because existing studies on contextual fundamental 
analysis (Piotroski, 2000; Mohanram, 2005) restrict their investigation to samples of either 
value or glamour stocks, a test of the models’ performance across both value and glamour 
contexts provides a better platform to explain the patterns of returns. 
Consistent with much of the extant literature, the paper presents strong evidence that, 
among listed stocks in the UK during 1991-2007, value stocks earned higher returns and 
were more financially distressed compared to glamour stocks. The paper also finds evidence 
that financially stronger stocks earn higher returns than weaker stocks. The main, and more 
interesting, evidence rests with the application of fundamental analysis models across 
value–glamour contexts. First, the paper finds evidence that both Piotroski’s F Score and 
Mohanram’s G Score, despite being carefully tailored for value and glamour stock 
respectively, work equally well across different value–glamour contexts. This evidence 
implies that in practice the F Score and G Score can be employed in any context, and it 
challenges the value of using stock styles to define the framework for developing contextual 
fundamental analysis models. Second, the findings suggest that value (glamour) investors 
tend to under-react to good (bad) financial information, and either fairly react or overreact to 
bad (good) financial information, in line with the behavioural model of asymmetric reaction to 
information due to confirmation bias (Rabin and Schrag, 1999). Third, the evidence also 
suggests that the outperformance of financially strong stocks and underperformance of 
financially weak stocks are due to investor’s behaviour rather than to different loadings on 
risk factors. Lastly, the efficiency of fundamental analysis strategies is found to be fairly 
consistent across time, even in bad states of the world1 where the marginal utility of 
consumption is high. Such consistency strengthens the practical implications of the findings 
and gives confidence to those investors who want to apply the strategies in practice, 
                                                           
1
 Within the scope of the paper, periods of general negative performance of the stock market 
are defined as “bad”. Please refer to section V.4. for more details. 
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especially in the light of the current financial crisis. Moreover, the consistency also lends 
very little support, if any, for the rational view of a risk-based explanation. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II motivates and develops testable hypotheses, 
followed by the explanation of the sample selection procedures and the discussion of the 
descriptive statistics in section III. The main methodologies are explained in section IV. The 
results are presented and discussed in section V, while section VI concludes the paper. 
 
II. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
The main claim of Piotroski’s (2000) model is that it performs particularly well when 
applied to US value stocks, while Mohanram’s (2005) model is specifically designed for US 
glamour stocks. First, whether these models work in the UK market is still an open question. 
Second, there is a lack of evidence on the efficiency of the models when applied outside the 
universe of value and glamour stocks. If Piotroski’s and Mohanram’s claims hold, one would 
expect to observe a decline in the efficiency of the models when applied outside the contexts 
for which they were originally designed. The first hypothesis is tested using our UK sample 
to supplement these evidence: 
H1a: Stocks that are financially stronger outperform those that are financially weaker.  
H1b: The outperformance of high F Score over low F Score stocks is greatest among 
value stocks and decreases as stock style improves, while the outperformance of high 
G Score over low G Score stocks is greatest among glamour stocks and decreases as 
stock style deteriorates.  
One of the most controversial aspects in the extant literature is the lack of an alternative 
theory to explain the stock return behaviour in the contexts of value and glamour stocks. 
When empirical evidence departs from the efficient market hypothesis, the most frequently 
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cited alternative explanation is biases in investor behaviour. When the risk-based 
explanation is rejected, value premiums are often attributed to investor over-reaction 
(Lakonishok et al., 1994). The over-reaction model relates investor’s behaviour to evidence 
about consistently biased human judgement errors, as documented in the psychology 
literature. It argues that investors tend to over-react to firm’s past performance, and this 
results in lower (higher) than rationally justified expectations about the future performance of 
value (glamour) stocks, which typically have weaker (stronger) past performance. The lower 
(higher) expectations are then responsible for the under-pricing (over-pricing) of value 
(glamour) stocks, which causes a value premium to occur. Moreover, the success of 
fundamental analysis models is generally attributed to investor’s under-reaction to published 
information due to psychological evidence about human conservatism bias (Edwards, 1968). 
This model predicts that investors fail to update their expectation timely when new 
information arrives. As a result, when good (bad) financial information are published, the 
price will not adjust instantaneously, but only slowly move up (down), creating an arbitrage 
opportunity and making it possible for fundamental analysis models to lead to abnormal 
returns. 
Given the contradictory predictions of the over-reaction and under-reaction models, it is 
important to study the behaviour of investors who may rely on fundamental analysis to 
inform their value–glamour investing strategies. How can the over-reaction behaviour of 
value-glamour investors be reconciled with the under-reaction behaviour of investors who 
use fundamental analysis? In other words, why does the market over-react in a sample of 
value or glamour stocks, but then under-react to fundamental information relating to these 
same stocks? The paper proposes an investor’s behaviour model that is built upon the 
psychological evidence on confirmation bias. This behavioural bias suggests that people 
tend to misinterpret information in a way that supports their current beliefs (Rabin and 
Schrag, 1999). Because value stocks are generally more financially distressed than glamour 
stocks (Fama and French, 1995), value investors typically hold more pessimistic believes 
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than glamour investors. Therefore, a confirmation bias behaviour is consistent with value 
investors interpreting financial information in an overly pessimistic way and thus under-
reacting to good information, in line with their pessimistic beliefs. Similarly, glamour investors 
who are affected by confirmation bias would under-react to bad information, since they hold 
optimistic beliefs. On the contrary, when new information is in support of investor’s current 
beliefs, i.e. bad information in value context and good information in glamour context, 
investors process such information rationally. However, as argued by Rabin and Schrag 
(1999 ), confirmation bias could also lead to overconfidence. Therefore, when new 
information is in support of investor’s current beliefs, some investors could be overconfident 
and thus over-react to such information. The paper investigates whether a confirmation bias 
in investor’s behaviour can explain the observed pattern of stock returns by testing the 
following hypotheses: 
 H2a: Among value (glamour) stocks, those which are financially stronger (weaker) 
earn abnormally positive (negative) returns. 
H2b: Among value (glamour) stocks, those which are financially weaker (stronger) 
earn either no abnormal returns or abnormally positive (negative) returns. 
 
III. DATA 
III.1 Sample Selection 
The paper uses stocks listed on the UK stock market during the period 1991-2007. All data 
are collected from Datastream and Worldscope. The 1991-2007 period has been chosen to 
ensure data availability and consistency. In order to avoid survivorship bias, stocks that are 
delisted during the period are also included. Some stocks are excluded from the analysis 
according to the following criteria. First, financial firms are excluded. Second, companies 
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with more than one type of ordinary share are also excluded. Third, being aware of the 
problems associated with Datastream’s return data (Ince and Porter, 2006), the following 
items are also excluded: (i) items which are not companies or shares (e.g. ADR, Index, etc.); 
(ii) non-equity securities; (iii) companies incorporated outside the UK; (iv) shares not traded 
on the main UK stock exchange; and (v) non ordinary shares. Fourth, for stock to be 
included in the sample, all data needed to calculate all variables as described in the 
Appendix must be available. Moreover, observations with a negative BM are also excluded 
because negative BM could not be explained in terms of future expectations. Fifth, because 
calculating returns from the Datastream’s Return Index suffers from errors when the level of 
Return Index and stock price is very small due to the discreteness of the Return Index and 
price data, stocks whose Return Index, prices and market capitalisation at the time of 
portfolio formation are very small are also excluded. This exclusion also frees the sample 
from very small firms, which are usually very illiquid. The thresholds for the exclusion of 
stocks with low Return Index, low price and small capitalisation are set at 0.10, £0.25 and £1 
million, respectively2. Sixth, due to the intra-industry scoring scheme for some signals of the 
G Score, if the number of firms in an industry (as defined by Datastream level 2 industry 
classification) in any given year is below five, all firms in that industry are excluded. The 
above exclusion process produces a sample of 13,761 firm-year observations3. On a year-
by-year basis, the number of observations is fairly stable, with a minimum of 679 
observations in 1991 and a maximum of 937 observations in 1999. This stability mitigates 
concerns that the analysis results could be biased by a few influential years.  
                                                           
2
 Although the thresholds are chosen somewhat arbitrarily, thresholds of 0.5 for the Return 
Index, 5, 10, 20 pence for stock price, and £0.5 million for market value were also used and 
the unreported results show that the main findings are qualitatively the same. 
3
 To mitigate concerns regarding the reliability of Datastream’s returns data, the correlation 
between the annual returns on the value-weighted portfolio that holds all sample stocks and 
returns on the FTSE All Shares Index are examined (Ince and Porter, 2006). The two return 
series are found to be highly correlated with a correlation coefficient is 0.95, which is 
significant at 1% level. 
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III.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Columns 2 to 6 of Table 1 provide some main descriptive statistics of the sample. The 
definitions of the variables are given in the Appendix. The statistics suggest the existence of 
some observations with very large DROA and DMargin. However, the magnitude of these 
variables does not matter because these figures are transformed into binary signals before 
being used in the main analysis. It is also notable that the means of F_ROA, F_CFO and 
F_Accrual are very large, which implies that most of the observations have good signals 
regarding profitability, cash flows and accruals (82.01%, 85.28% and 74.35%, respectively). 
This makes the distribution of observations across F Score heavily tilted toward larger 
values4, which is very similar to the US evidence presented in Piotroski (2000). Moreover, 
the mean of the size is remarkably larger than the median (£817 million as compared to £75 
million). This suggests the existence of some observations of very large size, which could 
dominate the returns on value-weighted portfolios. This characteristic of the sample 
motivates the use in the paper of an equally-weighted approach in portfolio’s formation5. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
IV. METHODOLOGY 
IV.1 Portfolio’s Formation 
In each year, stocks are ranked by F Score and G Score. Table 2 reports the 
distributions of firm-year observations across the F Score and G Score. The distribution 
                                                           
4
 See Table 2 and the related discussion in section IV.1. 
5
 See section IV.1. for a more detailed discussion on the choice of the portfolio’s formation 
approach. 
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across the F Score is very heavily tilted toward higher values, with very few observations in 
the lower values (only 4 and 98 observations with an F Score of 0 and 1, respectively). While 
the distribution of the G Score is more symmetric, there are fewer observations in the 
extreme values. Thus, rather than using only observations in the extremes to create 
portfolios of financially strong and weak stocks, as in Piotroski (2000 ) and Mohanram 
(2005 ), stocks with an F Score from 0 to 3 (G Score from 0 to 2) are grouped into the low F 
Score (G Score) portfolios; and stocks with an F Score from 7 to 9 (G Score from 5 to 7) are 
assigned to the high F Score (G Score) portfolios. In addition, stocks are also ranked yearly 
by BM, which is independent to the ranking by F Score and G Score. Stocks in the highest 
BM tercile are referred to as value stocks, those in the lowest BM tercile are glamour stocks 
and the rest are neutral stocks6.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Three types of portfolios are investigated, namely: (i) the long portfolios, with long 
positions in high F Score and high G Score stocks; (ii) the short portfolios, with short 
positions in low F Score and low G Score stocks; and (iii) the hedge portfolios, with long 
positions in high F Score and high G Score stocks, and short positions in low F Score and 
low G Score stocks. Each year, portfolios are formed at the end of June to avoid any look-
ahead bias. All positions are closed after one year from the date when the portfolio is 
                                                           
6
 Because the main interest lies in the sub-groups of financially strong and weak value 
stocks and financially strong and weak glamour stocks, sorting the sample into deciles or 
quintiles would make the sub-samples so small that the reliability of the statistical tests could 
be reduced. As shown in section V.I., sorting into terciles could reasonably differentiate 
value from glamour stocks in terms of returns and financial characteristics. 
12 
 
formed7. In the remainder of the paper, F Score and G Score strategies refer to trading 
strategies that hold one of the above portfolios.  
The following illustrates in more detail the time convention used in the paper. Portfolios 
are formed at the beginning of July each year during the seventeen-year period 1991-2007. 
At the portfolio forming date, i.e. on the 1st of July in each year t, the book-to-market ratios 
are calculated using book value at the fiscal year-end of year t – 1 and market value at the 
end of December of year t – 1. The fundamental signals are calculated using the financial 
statements for the fiscal year ending in any month in year t – 1. Firm’s size is measured as 
market value at the portfolio forming date. Returns are measured for the twelve-month 
period starting from the beginning of July of year t. Two issues concerning this approach 
need further discussion. First, the approach results in portfolios that comprise of firms with 
different year-end dates. The concern is that there could be a gap between the date of the 
financial statement release and the portfolio forming date (especially for those firms with 
early-in-the-year fiscal year-end dates) and ignoring returns during such period could be 
problematic (Bernard et al., 1997). The alternative is to measure returns from, say, six 
months after the (varying) fiscal year-ends. However, the chosen methodology in the paper 
represents a more practicable trading strategy because the portfolio forming date is fixed. 
Second, market values at the end of December are used to calculate BM ratios, which 
makes the numerator and the denominator of the ratio misaligned in terms of time. Fama 
and French (1992) argue that although this is not a perfect approach, switching to using 
market values at fiscal year-ends would not be preferable as it would suffer from the bias 
from market-wide variation in BM ratio during the year. 
Fama (1998 ) emphasizes the importance of the issues associated with choosing an 
equally-weighted or a value-weighted approach in portfolio’s formation. He shows that in 
                                                           
7
 In unreported results, when the two-year returns are measured, most of the main findings 
of the paper are not altered. 
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relation to many anomalies, changing the way of calculating portfolio’s returns between an 
equally-weighted and a value-weighted approach can affect significantly the magnitudes of 
the anomalous returns, or even in some cases eliminate the anomalies. Although the 
equally-weighted approach is commonly used in the long-term anomaly literature, it suffers 
from the influence of very small stocks. Fama and French (2008 ) highlight the influential 
roles of very small stocks by showing that 60% of stocks listed on the NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ can be classified as very small stocks, while they account for only 3% of the whole 
market capitalization. However, the value-weighted approach can also be problematic, as it 
can be influenced by very large stocks. Therefore, since there are some stocks of very large 
size in the sample8, the paper employs an equally-weighted approach in forming portfolios9. 
IV.2 Measurement of Returns 
The existing literature often emphasizes the importance of treating delisting returns, 
especially in studies on market anomalies (Shumway, 1997; Beaver et al., 2007). Shumway 
(1997) finds that delisting returns are commonly missed by the CRSP database for stocks 
that are delisted due to performance-related reasons. This observation reveals the delisting 
bias of CRSP and highlights the importance of a proper treatment of missing delisting 
returns. Many studies simply use a single value, usually -100% or 0, to replace missing 
delisting returns (e.g. Piotroski, 2000), regardless of the reasons. However, such approach is 
obviously inappropriate because the consequences of a performance-related delisting are 
clearly different from a delisting due to merger or acquisition. Shumway (1997) suggests that 
for the US market, if a delisting return is missing, rather than excluding the stock, a 
replacement value of -30% should be used if the delisting is performance-related, or zero 
                                                           
8
 See the discussion on descriptive statistics in section III.2. 
9
 With reference to the concerns discussed above about the equally-weighted approach, 
unreported results show that most of the main results do not change significantly when the 
sample is free from micro stocks, defined as those stocks with market capitalizations below 
the 20th percentile of the sample. 
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otherwise. To illustrate the important sensitivity of tests of market efficiency to the treatment 
of delisting returns, Shumway and Warther (1999 ) find that, among NASDAQ stocks, the 
size effect disappears if performance-related delisting returns are properly treated. Rather 
than using a single replacement value, Beaver et al. (2007) adopt an approach that 
estimates different replacement values for different delisting reasons. They find that the 
premiums in the book-to-market, earning-to-price and cash-flows-to-price effects increase, 
and those in the accruals anomaly decrease, when delisting returns are properly handled. 
They also argue that the treatment of delisting returns can affect the estimate of market 
returns.  
In the UK, however, although Datastream is among the most commonly used databases 
in accounting and finance research, there is little evidence of the existence of a delisting bias 
in the Datastream database and of the effects of different treatments of delisting returns on 
findings. A common approach is to adopt a single replacement value, where a -100% value 
is used as replacement if the delisting of a stock is performance related, and zero otherwise 
(Liu et al., 1999; Chi-Hsiou Hung et al., 2004). However, as noted by Beaver et al. (2007), 
this approach disregards the partial returns when the delisting date is not exactly at the 
beginning of the period of compounding returns. To be more specific, it is problematic to use 
a zero value as replacement in cases when the stock is delisted because of non-
performance, since it does not take into account the returns from the portfolio formation date 
to the delisting date.  
In the paper, raw returns are measured as the arithmetic growth of the Datastream’s 
Return Index from the beginning of July of year t to the end of June of year t + 1. Based on 
the discussion above, if a stock is delisted within one year of portfolio formation, the raw 
return is calculated as:  
, = 1 + ,
 × 1 +  − 1 (1) 
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where: , is the one-year raw return; ,
 is the return from the portfolio forming date 
to the date when the stock is delisted10;  is the delisting returns, which is -100% if the firm 
is delisted due to performance-related reasons and zero otherwise11. This procedure is 
equivalent to assuming that: (i) investors will lose all of their investment if the delisting is 
performance related; and (ii) if the delisting is not performance related, investors will receive 
the partial returns from the portfolio forming date to the date of delisting. While there is no 
obvious way to fully validate these assumptions, the first assumption is justified by the fact 
that it is common practice in the UK for stockholders not to receive any return after the stock 
is delisted (Kaiser, 1996; Agarwal and Taffler, 2008). With respect to the second 
assumption, it must be emphasised that the main focus of the paper is the analysis and 
comparison of groups of value and glamour stocks, and sub-groups of financially strong and 
weak stocks. Since there is no clear motive why a stock delisted because of non-
performance related reasons should belong to a certain group of stocks, the findings of the 
paper should not be affected by this assumption. In other words, there is no reason to 
believe that this assumption would create a systematic bias in the results. 
It is very common in the literature to measure abnormal returns by using a benchmark 
portfolio. For example, Piotroski (2000 ) uses the value-weighted market portfolio and 
Mohanram (2005) uses size deciles as benchmark. However, it is well documented that 
using referencing portfolios can make the test statistics severely misspecified, and that the 
null hypothesis is rejected more often than the theoretical rejection rates would suggest 
(Barber and Lyon, 1997; Kothari and Warner, 1997). Because the issue of whether the 
outperformance of financially stronger stocks over financially weaker stocks is due to risk is 
crucial in this area of study, this can significantly distort the results. Barber and Lyon (1997 ) 
                                                           
10
 It is assumed that this return is wholly reinvested. 
11
 Delisting reasons are identified through scanning for key words in the Datastream’s 
footnotes to company status. 
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compare different approaches to calculate abnormal returns, including those using reference 
portfolios, using the Fama and French three-factor model, and using the control firm 
matching approach. They document that the control firm matching approach is the best 
performing model in relation to alleviating most of the sources of bias, and it is therefore 
likely to provide the best well-specified test statistics. This evidence motivates the use in the 
paper of the control firm matching approach. Specifically, abnormal returns are measured by 
subtracting from the raw returns of each sample firm the corresponding raw returns of a 
control firm having similar BM and size. Following Barber and Lyon (1997), the market 
capitalization of the control stock falls between 70% and 130% that of the sample stock, and 
the BM is the closest to that of the sample stock. Nonetheless, to enable comparison 
between the paper’s findings and the findings of prior studies, market-adjusted returns are 
also reported in the portfolio analysis12. However, in the regression analysis, only Barber and 
Lyon’s (1997) control-firm-adjusted returns are discussed. 
IV.3 Significance Testing 
In the portfolio analysis, two parametric tests are performed. First, the one-sample t-test 
is employed to investigate whether portfolio’s abnormal returns are significantly different 
from zero. This is applicable to all measures of abnormal returns, but not to raw returns. 
Second, the independent sample’s t-test compares the mean returns between the long and 
short portfolios (i.e. it tests whether the returns on the hedge portfolios are significantly 
different from zero) and is applicable to all three measures of returns. However, in the 
context of long-run buy-and-hold abnormal returns, these parametric tests suffer from the 
departure of the abnormal returns from basic assumptions, including normality and 
stationary. Even under the Barber and Lyon’s (1997) control-firm-matching approach, the 
problems could be pervasive as there is no evidence that such approach is effective outside 
                                                           
12
 Unreported results also show that the main evidence presented in the paper is very similar 
when returns are size-adjusted. 
17 
 
the contexts investigated by Barber and Lyon (Kothari and Warner, 1997). In such case, the 
bootstrap technique represents a reasonable alternative that can supplement the statistical 
inferences from the traditional parametric tests. Therefore, the paper also employs the 
bootstrap approach to further support the evidence from the parametric testing. The 
following illustrates the bootstrap procedure for testing the null hypothesis that market-
adjusted return on the high-BM high-F-Score portfolio is zero (the same procedure is applied 
to all other return metrics and all other portfolios). First, observations with BM ratios in the 
highest tercile are drawn randomly and assigned to a pseudo portfolio. The random selection 
continues until the number of stocks in the pseudo portfolio is equal to the number of stocks 
in the actual high-BM high-F-Score portfolio. Second, the equally-weighted market-adjusted 
return on the pseudo portfolio is calculated, and this represents one observation of the 
empirical distribution of abnormal returns under the null hypothesis. Third, the process is 
repeated 1,000 times to create an empirical distribution of abnormal returns consisting of 
1,000 observations. Finally, the two-tailed bootstrap p-value is estimated as: 
 −  =  2 × min { 
∗ >  ,  
∗ <  }  (2) 
where:  −  is the bootstrap p-value; R& '∗ are the bootstrap mean returns of the pseudo 
portfolios (i = 1, 2 ... 1000); R& is the mean return of the actual portfolio; P(.) is the probability 
function. 
IV.4 Cross Section Regressions 
The regression approach provides additional evidence of the power of the F Score and 
the G Score to predict future cross-sectional stock returns in value–glamour contexts, and 
whether such power is subsumed by other known risk factors, such as size and BM. 
Besides, a regression approach can provide a useful interpretation of how the F Score and 
the G Score are related to future returns. In the regression analysis, the control-firm-adjusted 
returns are used as the dependent variable. Firstly, the relation between abnormal returns 
and the F Score, and the G Score is examined using the following regression: 
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()*1 =  + +  , log01 + ,2 log345 + ,6Score  (3) 
where, CFAR1 is the control-firm-adjusted returns; BM is the book-to-market ratio; Size is 
the market value; and Score is either the F Score or the G Score13. This specification allows 
to test whether there is a relationship between financial conditions and abnormal returns.  
In the second specification, the F Score and G Score are decomposed into two 
components to enable the investigation of the marginal effect of strong versus weak financial 
conditions on future returns. More specifically, the following regression is estimated: 
()*1 =  + +  , log01 + ,2 log345 + ,6High_Score + ,>Low_Score  (4) 
where, High_Score is either (i) the dummy variables that take the value of 1 if the stock is in 
the high F Score group, and zero otherwise; or (ii) the dummy variables that take the value 
of 1 if the stock is in the high G Score group, and zero otherwise; Low_Score is either (i) the 
dummy variables that take the value of 1 if the stock is in the low F Score group, and zero 
otherwise; or (ii) the dummy variables that take the value of 1 if the stock is in the low G 
Score group, and zero otherwise. This specification allows for the investigation of whether 
the relation between financial conditions and returns are driven by both/either financially 
strong stocks and/or financially weak stocks, and provides evidence about the confirmation 
bias.  
Only in the regression analysis, all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1th and 99th 
percentiles to mitigate concerns regarding outliers. Following Fama and MacBeth (1973 ), 
regressions are run in relation to every year from 1991 to 2007, and the coefficients are the 
averages across 17 annual regressions. To gain statistical inference on the significance of 
                                                           
13
 Although control-firm-adjusted returns are already adjusted for size and BM as part of the 
matching process, we still introduce size and BM as control variables in the regressions to 
guard our findings against any remained size and BM effects that are not fully captured by 
the matching process. 
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the coefficients, standard errors are corrected for autocorrelation using the Newey and West 
(1987 ) methodology. Regressions are run in samples of value, neutral and glamour 
stocks14. The results are reported in Table 5 and discussed in section V.3. 
 
V. RESULTS 
V.1 Value Premiums and Fundamental Characteristics of Value–Glamour Stocks 
Since the paper is premised on the existence of value premiums, it is important to firstly 
confirm this observation in the light of the sample adopted by the paper. Moreover, the main 
test of investor’s confirmation bias is also based on the basic premise that value investors 
are more pessimistic and glamour investors are more optimistic. Therefore, whether or not 
value stocks are more financially distressed than glamour stocks in the sample used is very 
important, not only because it could provide justification for the contextual fundamental 
analysis approach using the value–glamour separation, but also because such observation 
could validate the basic premises underlying the main test of the paper. To provide such 
validation, the last four columns of Table 1 compare raw returns and fundamental 
characteristics of value stocks with those of glamour stocks - i.e., stocks in the highest 
versus those in the lowest BM tercile. The findings suggest that the RR1 of high BM (value) 
stocks are higher than those of low BM (glamour) stocks by 6.36% (statistically significant at 
1% level), which confirms the well-documented value-glamour effect15. It is also shown that 
value stocks are more financially distressed, once again in line with earlier evidence (e.g. 
Fama and French, 1995). Specifically, value stocks tend to be less profitable with 
significantly lower ROA. With respect to the components of earnings, value stocks also 
                                                           
14
 Unreported results also show that pooled regressions would make no material change to 
the main conclusions in this section.  
15
 See, for example, Fama and French (1992) and Lakonishok et al. (1994) for US evidence, 
and Gregory et al. (2001) for evidence on the UK market. 
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appear to have lower cash flows and larger accruals components. Moreover, value stocks 
are associated with lower capital expenditure and research and development expenses, 
which again signal more negative financial prospects. When being translated into binary 
signals, value stocks tend once again to be less profitable with lower F_ROA, F_DROA, 
F_Margin, G_ROA and G_CFO. Value stocks also have more volatile profits and sales 
growth, in addition to less capital expenditure and research and development expenses, and 
thus a worse prospect for future sales and earnings.  
Although the individual binary signals generally suggest that value stocks are more 
financially distressed than glamour stocks, as discussed above, the overall firm’s strength 
reveals a rather unpredictable picture. While value stocks have significantly lower G Scores 
than glamour stocks as predicted, surprisingly value and glamour stocks have 
indistinguishable F Scores. However, it can be noted that EQ_Offer is the main cause of 
higher F Scores for value stocks (the difference is 0.2831, which is significant at 1% level). 
While not issuing equity may signal good financial prospects, as proposed by the pecking 
order hypothesis, it can also be simply due to the constraints faced by distressed firms. 
Thus, it is hard to conclude that higher EQ_Offer makes value stocks less distressed than 
glamour stocks. Unreported results show that, as predicted, excluding EQ_Offer gives an 
average F Score for value stocks that is significantly lower than that of glamour stocks. To 
provide further evidence on whether value stocks are more financially distressed, Table 3 
presents the correlations between BM, F Score and G Score. As predicted, the F Score and 
the G Score exhibit a strong and significant positive relationship as they are both designed to 
measure firm’s financial strength. The evidence also shows that both F Score and G Score 
are negatively related with BM, which tends to suggest that value stocks are more financially 
distressed. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
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In summary, the evidence presented in this section: (i) confirms the existence of value 
premium in the sample; and (ii) suggests that value stocks are more financially distressed 
than glamour stocks. It suggests that the efficiency of fundamental analysis models could be 
enhanced by contextualising them to address the unique properties of value and glamour 
stocks. Piotroski’s (2000) and Mohanram’s (2005) models were originally designed to 
respond to this evidence. However, it is argued in the next section that these models are 
equally efficient when applied outside the contexts for which they were designed. 
V.2 Portfolio Analysis 
Table 4 reports returns on F Score and G Score strategies across sub-samples of value, 
neutral and glamour stocks, as well as a general sample containing all available stocks, 
together with the corresponding results from the significance tests. It can be observed 
across value–glamour contexts and return metrics that returns on the hedge portfolios are 
consistently positive. Under the parametric t-tests, the only occasions when the F Score 
premium (i.e. the outperformance of high F Score over low F Score stocks) is insignificant 
are in relation to glamour stocks when returns are market-adjusted, and value stocks when 
returns are control-firm-adjusted (t-statistics of 1.545 and 1.425, respectively). Similarly, the 
G Score premium is statistically significant in most cases, except for the VMAR1 among 
glamour stocks and CFAR1 among neutral stocks (t-statistics of 1.570 and 1.585 
respectively). However, the bootstrap tests give very strong and consistent evidence of the 
statistical significance of returns on the hedge portfolios. In general thus, the evidence 
suggests that financially stronger stocks outperform their weaker counterparts, even after 
returns are adjusted for risks. Moreover, both F Score and G Score premiums appear to 
change unsystematically when the value measure, BM, increases. Furthermore, the 
unconditional application of an F Score and G Score strategy on BM (i.e. among all available 
stocks) also yields significant positive premiums. These observations are consistent across 
all return metrics. Thus, it is hard to conclude that the F Score is more efficient among value 
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stocks and the G Score is more efficient among glamour stocks. In summary, the evidence 
thus far lends strong support to hypothesis H1a and tends to reject hypothesis H1b.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
The evidence presented here is an interesting supplement to Piotroski (2000) and 
Mohanram (2005), suggesting that the F Score (G Score), although being aggregated from a 
range of fundamental signals that address the unique characteristics of value (glamour) 
stocks, works equally well outside the context of value (glamour) stocks. This finding also 
strengthens the US evidence documented by Fama and French (2006 ) that the F Score is 
effective in a general sample of stocks as a predictor of future cross-section stock returns. 
To the extent that Piotroski’s F Score and Mohanram’s G Score represent careful attempts 
to tailor fundamental analysis models to value and glamour stocks, the evidence in the paper 
challenges the appeal of separating stocks based on styles to build contextual fundamental 
analysis models.  
Table 4 also shows evidence that strongly supports hypothesis H2a. Specifically, value 
stocks with a high F Score earn positive abnormal returns (VMAR1 is 0.0706 and CFAR1 is 
0.0282), and glamour stocks with a low F Score earn negative abnormal returns (VMAR1 is -
0.0746 and CFAR1 is -0.1111). Similarly, value stocks with a high G Score also earn positive 
abnormal returns (VMAR1 is 0.0825 and CFAR1 is 0.0784), and glamour stocks with a low 
G Score earn negative abnormal returns (VMAR1 is -0.051 and CFAR1 is -0.0578). All of 
these abnormal returns are statistically significant as inferred by both the parametric t-tests 
and the bootstrap p-values, suggesting that a typical value (glamour) investor would under-
react to good (bad) financial information.  
Moreover, Table 4 also lends strong supports to hypothesis H2b, although the picture is 
not entirely similar under the two abnormal return metrics (i.e. VMAR1 and CFAR1) and 
measures of overall firm’s strength (i.e. F Score and G Score). Considering F Score 
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strategies first, value stocks with low F Scores earn negative abnormal returns, but such 
abnormal returns seem not statistically significant. VMAR1 is -0.0419 with a relatively low t-
statistic of 1.841 and high bootstrap p-value of 0.088 (i.e. the null cannot be rejected at 5% 
level), while CFAR1 is -0.0238, but it is clearly insignificant under both the parametric and 
bootstrap tests. On the contrary, for the strong glamour stocks, while the positive CFAR1 of 
0.0329 seems insignificant with a relatively low t-statistic of 1.870 and a high bootstrap p-
value of 0.104, the market-adjusted return seems to suggest a market overreaction (VMAR1 
is -0.0044, which is significant at least under the bootstrap test with p-value of 0.068). 
Second, when firm’s strength is measured by the G Score, the overall evidence is also very 
much in line with hypothesis H2b. When returns are market-adjusted, there is evidence of 
value investor’s overreaction to bad financial information (VMAR1 on value stocks with low G 
Score is 0.0283, which is statistically significant under both the parametric and bootstrap 
tests) and glamour investor’s overreaction to good financial information (VMAR1 on glamour 
stocks with high G Score is -0.0071, which is significant under the bootstrap test with p-value 
of 0.000). Under CFAR1, hypothesis H2b is also supported, at least among value stocks with 
low G Score where CFAR1 is negative but insignificant (t-statistics is -0.217 and bootstrap p-
value is 0.808). Generally, the evidence seems to suggest that value (glamour) investors’ 
reaction to bad (good) financial information is somewhere between a rational response and 
overreaction.  
The support for hypotheses H2a and H2b can also be strengthened by looking at the 
contribution to the hedge portfolios of long positions in strong stocks relatively to that of short 
positions in weak stocks. The evidence suggests that the relative contribution of long 
positions in strong stocks to the hedge portfolios is greatest among value stocks. When 
firm’s strength is measured by the F Score, it is 63% if returns are measured net of market 
returns, or 54% as measured by CFAR1; the corresponding percentages are 152% or 95%, 
respectively, in relation to the G Score. It also systematically decreases while the stock style 
improves (i.e. when the cells go from left to right in Table 4), leading to the dominant 
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contribution of short positions among glamour stocks (106% under VMAR1, or 77% under 
CFAR1 when F Score is used, and 116% or 61% if G Score is used). Such evidence further 
suggests that a typical investor would be most severely biased when new information arrives 
that is not in line with expectations, i.e. when good financial information reaches a value 
investor, or bad information is received by a glamour investor. 
Overall, the evidence presented in this section lends strong supports for the hypotheses 
H1a, H2a, H2b and tends to reject hypothesis H1b. First, high F Score and G Score stocks 
outperform low F Score and G Score stocks across value, neutral and glamour contexts, and 
also in the general sample of stocks. Second, F Score and G Score strategies are not most 
effective when applied among value stocks and glamour stocks, respectively. Third, the 
evidence provides very strong support for the confirmation bias of value and glamour 
investors. This implies that the main benefit of financial statement analysis in a value context 
comes mainly from the identification of financially strong stocks, while the main benefit of 
analyzing glamour stock’s financial statements is to avoid the poorly-performing firms. 
Moreover, unreported results also show that the evidence documented in this section is 
robust when: (i) sales-to-price ratio is used as the value measure16, thus showing that the 
main findings are not unique to the use of BM as the value measure; and (ii) the sample is 
free from micro stocks (defined as stocks whose market capitalizations are below the 20th 
percentile of the sample), thus mitigating the concerns about employing an equally-weighted 
portfolio approach. 
V.3 Regression Analysis 
Table 5 reports the results of the regression analysis. The evidence from estimating 
equation (3) strongly suggests that there is a positive relationship between F Score, G Score 
                                                           
16
 Sales-to-price ratio is chosen for robustness reasons because other value measures are correlated 
with some components of the composite F Score and G Score and thus could introduce some bias into 
the analysis. 
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and abnormal returns, as the coefficients of the F Score and the G Score are all positive and 
statistically significant. This observation suggests that the predictive powers of the F Score 
and the G Score go beyond the well-documented size and BM effects, since both size and 
BM are included in the regressions. Furthermore, there is no clear pattern to suggest that 
these effects are greater or smaller when applied in a particular context, as the magnitude of 
the coefficients vary unsystematically when stock’s style changes. Therefore, the evidence 
further supports the acceptance of hypothesis H1a and the rejection of hypothesis H1b, in 
line with the portfolio analysis in the previous section. 
The evidence of confirmation bias is provided by estimating equation (4). If the 
confirmation bias exists, it is expected that: (i) among value stocks, the coefficients of High F 
Score and High G Score are significantly positive, and the coefficients of Low F Score and 
Low G Score are insignificant; (ii) among glamour stocks, the relation is driven mainly by 
financially weaker stocks, i.e. the coefficients of High F Score and High G Score are 
insignificant, and the coefficients of Low F Score and Low G Score are significantly negative; 
and (iii) the magnitude of the coefficients of High F Score and High G Score decreases 
systematically as stock style improves (i.e., when going from left to right in Table 5), while 
the magnitude of the coefficients of Low F Score and Low G Score decreases systematically 
as stock style deteriorates (i.e., when going from right to left in Table 5). Most of these 
empirical predictions of the confirmation bias are supported by the findings presented in 
Table 5. The coefficient of High G Score among value stocks is significantly positive, and the 
magnitude of this coefficient decreases as stock style improves, from 0.0649 among value 
stocks to 0.0233 among glamour stocks. Meanwhile, the coefficient of Low G Score among 
value stock is insignificant. Taken together with the significantly positive relationship 
between G Score and returns as discussed earlier, the evidence suggests that the 
relationship between G Score and returns is driven mainly by financially stronger stocks. On 
the contrary, the coefficient of Low G Score among glamour stocks is -0.0870 and it is 
significant at 1% level, and its magnitude decreases to as low as -0.0240 among value 
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stocks and it becomes insignificant. Similarly, the coefficient of Low F Score is significantly 
negative among glamour stocks (-0.1092 and significant at 1% level) and it decreases as 
stock style deteriorates. Meanwhile, the coefficients of High F Score and High G Score 
among glamour stocks are both positive and statistically insignificant, suggesting that among 
glamour stocks the positive relation between strong financial conditions and returns is 
subsumed by the stronger negative relation between weak financial conditions and returns. 
In short, aside from the only exception of the statistically insignificant coefficient of High F 
Score among value stocks, the general evidence as reported in Table 5 provides striking 
evidence in support of the confirmation bias and hypotheses H2a and H2b. 
 [Insert Table 5 here] 
 
Overall, the regression analysis provides evidence which is fully in line with the findings 
documented using portfolio tests in the previous section. The consistency of the evidence 
across different methodologies leads to our conclusion that the confirmation bias does exist. 
V.4 F Score and G Score Strategies Across Time 
This section tests the efficiency of F Score and G Score strategies across time. The 
purpose of this analysis is twofold: (i) to give confidence to investors who are interested in 
applying these strategies, the consistency across time is important, especially in the context 
of the current financial crisis; and (ii) the test across time could shed light on the debate 
central to the paper between risk-based versus behavioural motives. Although the evidence 
from both portfolio and regression analyses seem to be inconsistent with a risk-based 
explanation, it could be argued that the observed returns could be due to some omitted risk 
factors, in addition to size and BM. Although this possibility cannot be conclusively excluded 
within the scope of this paper, the findings presented in this section should mitigate the 
concerns. Lakonishok et al. (1994) argue that for value stocks to be riskier than glamour 
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stocks, glamour stocks should outperform value stocks in some states of the world, and 
these states should on average be ‘bad’ states. In ‘bad’ states of the world, a risk-averse 
investor should prefer glamour stocks to value stocks, if value stocks are indeed riskier. 
Following this line of argument, this section further investigates whether high F Score and G 
Score stocks are riskier than low F Score and G Score stocks. 
Table 6 presents the raw returns on the high and low F Score and G Score stocks, 
together with the returns on the hedge portfolios that long (short) stocks with high (low) F 
Score and G Score. The findings show that over the sample period, high F Score stocks 
outperform low F Score stocks in 16 out of 17 years, the return difference being statistically 
significant in 11 out of the 16 years, except for 1999 where the hedge return is negative but 
insignificant. High G Score stocks also outperform low G Score stocks in 12 years, and the 
return difference being statistically significant in 9 out of the 12 years. The second column in 
Table 6 classifies the state of the stock market into either ‘good’ or ‘bad’. There are different 
views and definitions of a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ market condition. The paper identifies a ‘good’ 
market condition with a stock market in an upward trend, and vice versa a ‘bad’ state when 
the market is falling (Chi-Hsiou Hung et al., 2004). Accordingly, within the scope of the 
paper, a ‘good’ (‘bad’) market is identified when the contemporary return on the FTSE All 
Shares Index is positive (negative). Using this classification, the years 2000, 2001, 2002 and 
2007 are classified as ‘bad’ years, and in all these ‘bad’ years high F Score and high G 
Score stocks consistently outperforms stocks with weaker financial performance.   
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
In summary, the analysis in this section provides further challenges to the view that 
investors base their decisions on risk-based motives. Moreover, the evidence on the 
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consistent performance of the F Score and G Score strategies across time could lend more 
confidence to investors who are keen to apply these strategies in practice. 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The paper investigates the performance of fundamental analysis strategies across value and 
glamour stocks. Piotroski’s (2000) F Score and Mohanram’s (2005) G Score are the two 
fundamental analysis models employed, as they are originally designed to suit value and 
glamour stocks, respectively. Using a sample of UK listed stocks during the period 1991-
2007, the paper firstly compares returns and fundamental characteristics of value and 
glamour stocks. Earlier evidence (Fama and French, 1992, 1995; and Gregory et al., 2001) 
is confirmed by the findings that the value premium exists and that value stocks are indeed 
more financially distressed.  
The main focus of the investigation then turns to the question of how fundamental 
analysis strategies perform in different value and glamour contexts. While there is strong 
evidence that firms with stronger financial position outperform weaker stocks, there is very 
little evidence that such effect is limited to a specific group of stocks with similar value or 
glamour characteristics. Thus, the F Score and the G Score could be used as a fundamental 
analysis model for any type of stocks. While Piotroski (2000) and Mohanram (2005) include 
careful and reasonable procedures to tailor the models for either value or glamour stocks, 
the evidence in the paper challenges the feasibility of tailoring fundamental analysis models 
to value and glamour stocks. There is also little evidence in support of a risk-based 
explanation for the outperformance of financially strong stocks.  
More interestingly, the evidence documented in the paper is consistent with a 
behavioural investment model, where due to confirmation bias (1) value investors under-
react to good information while they fairly react or even overreact to bad information, and (2) 
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glamour investors under-react to bad information but good information is processed quite 
efficiently or even overconfidently. This investment behaviour implies that in the context of 
value stocks, the main benefit of analyzing financial statements is to identify the financially 
strong stocks, while fundamental analysis among glamour firms is mainly aimed at avoiding 
the poor performing firms. The framework fits well with the practice of value and glamour 
investing. While restricting their attention to “cheap” stocks, which are typically financially 
distressed, value investors are seeking the ‘dusty gems’, i.e. those distressed stocks that are 
actually worth more. In contrast, glamour investors, whose money are invested in safe 
places with those well-known growth stocks, need to ensure that they exclude ‘falling stars’, 
that is those traditionally good companies which are facing recent financial problems. The 
fundamental analysis models investigated in the paper can help value and glamour investors 
analyse recent financial statements and identify the ‘dusty gems’ and the ‘falling stars’. In 
addition, the findings presented here also have useful practical implications, especially for 
value – glamour investors. Our evidence suggests that in value–glamour contexts investor’s 
behaviour is asymmetric and dependent upon the recent financial information released. In a 
value context, a typical value investor updates good news only slowly, while bad news is 
often reflected fairly or even too quickly. In contrast, in a glamour context, the release of 
good news is expected, thus it is often reflected instantly or even too quickly into stock 
prices, while bad news travel too slowly. Therefore, a value or glamour trading strategy that 
exploits this sup-optimal behaviour could increase profitability. 
Finally, the evidence presented in the paper of investor’s confirmation bias creates some 
interesting research opportunities. For example, researchers may ask how managers 
respond to a market that is more willing to accept information that confirms its priors. If the 
confirmation bias hypothesis holds, and if managers understand this behaviour, it could be 
expected that at times manager may try to report financial information that is in line with 
market expectations through, for example, the mechanism of accruals management, or even 
real operations management. Evidence along these lines may further support the existence 
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of the market confirmation bias and provide interesting knowledge about manager’s 
behaviour in respond to the behavioural bias of the market. 
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APPENDIX 
Definitions of Variables 
RR1 is the buy-and-hold raw returns, measured by the arithmetic growth of Datastream’s 
Return Index from July of year t to June of year t + 1. If a stock is delisted in one year after 
portfolio formation, raw returns are calculated as: RRt,t+1 = (1 + RRt,d) (1 + DR) – 1 (where: 
RRt,t+1 is one-year raw return, RRt,d is return from portfolio forming date to the date when the 
stock is delisted, DR is delisting returns, which is -100% if the firm is delisted due to 
performance-related reasons and 0 otherwise). 
VMAR1 is the one-year market-adjusted returns calculated as the difference between raw 
returns and returns on the value-weighted market portfolio.  
CFAR1 is the control-firm-adjusted returns calculated as the difference between raw returns 
and the corresponding returns on the control stock. Following Barber and Lyon (1997), for 
each sample stock, the control stock is the stock whose market capitalization is between 
70% and 130% that of the sample stock, and whose BM is closest to that of the sample 
stock.  
Size is the market value of the firms at the end of June.  
BM is the book-to-market ratio, calculated as book value of common equity at the end of the 
fiscal year divided by the market value at the end of December.  
ROA is the returns-on-assets ratio, calculated as the net income, before extraordinary 
income and after preferred dividend, scaled by initial total assets.  
DROA is the change in ROA since the last fiscal year.  
CFO is the cash flow from operations17 scaled by initial total assets.  
Accrual is the total accrual component of earning, calculated as ROA less CFO.  
DLever is the change in debt ratio from the previous year, where debt ratio is the ratio of 
long-term debt, including the portion of long-term debt classified as short-term debt, to 
average total assets.  
                                                           
17
 If a firm has a Cash Flow Statement, net cash flow from operations is used. If a firm does 
not have a Cash Flow Statement for a year, cash flow from operations is estimated by: CF = 
OpFund – (DCA – DCash) + DCL (where: CF is cash flow from operations, OpFund is funds 
from operations, which include net income plus all non-cash charges, such as depreciation; 
DCA is change in current assets from last fiscal year; DCash is change in cash and cash 
equivalence from last fiscal year; DCL is change in current liabilities from last fiscal year). 
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DLiquid is the change in current ratio from the previous year, where the current ratio is the 
ratio of current assets to current liabilities.  
DMargin is the change in gross margin ratio from the previous year, where the gross margin 
ratio is the ratio of gross income (which equals to net sales less cost of goods sold18) to net 
sales.  
DTurn is the change in asset turnover ratio from the previous year, where the asset turnover 
ratio is the ratio of net sales to average total assets.  
SALESVAR and ROAVAR is the variance of a firm’s sales and ROA during the last five 
years19.  
CAPEX is the capital expenditure on assets ratio, calculated as capital expenditure scaled 
by initial total assets.  
RD is the research and development expenditure on assets ratio, calculated as research and 
development expenditure scaled by initial total assets. 
If a firm has positive ROA, DROA, CFO, Dliquid, DMargin, DTurn or negative Accruals and 
DLever, F_ROA, F_DROA, F_CFO, F_Dliquid, F_DMargin, F_DTurn, F_Accrual, 
F_DLever are one, and zero otherwise. EQ_Offer is one if there is no seasoned common 
equity offering during the year prior to portfolio formation, and zero otherwise20.  
                                                           
18
 When cost of goods sold is unavailable from Datastream, it is assumed that the 
corresponding data equals to zero. The validity of this assumption is ad hoc checked as 
follows. First, a list of observations is compiled, which satisfy all other sample selection 
requirements but do not have data for cost of goods sold. It is noticed that many of the 
missing information relates to either the services industry, or to firms in the very early stage 
(within one year) of incorporation (152 out of 263 observations), which could potentially 
mean the corresponding firms simply have zero cost of goods sold in that year. Second, the 
actual annual reports of a random sub-sample of the compiled list are checked and this 
shows that the unavailability of observations on Datastream is more likely to be due to a zero 
value rather than a real missing data. Therefore, unreported data are treated as having a 
value of zero. The same treatment is applied to other data that are likely to be zero, including 
long-term debt, capital expenditure, research and development expenditure, and net 
proceeds from issuing stock.  
19
 If there is not enough data for the last five years, data for at least three most recent years 
are used.  
20
 A seasoned equity offer is identified when: (i) the firm has positive net proceeds from 
issuing common or preferred stock in the last fiscal year; and (ii) the firm’s number of 
outstanding common shares has increased by at least 0.1% since the last fiscal year.  
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If a firm has ROA, CFO, CAPEX, RD larger than the industry median or SALESVAR and 
ROAVAR21 smaller than the industry median, G_ROA, G_CFO, G_CAPEX, G_RD, 
G_SALESVAR, G_ROAVAR are one, and zero otherwise. 
  
F Score  = F_ROA + F_DROA + F_CFO + F_Accrual + F_DLever + F_DLiquid + F_DTurn +  
F_DMargin + EQOffer 
G Score22 = G_ROA + G_CFO + F_Accrual + G_ROAVAR + G_SALESVAR + G_CAPEX + 
G_RD 
  
                                                           
21
 If data for at least three most recent years are not available, G_SALESVAR and 
G_ROAVAR are assumed to be zero. 
22
 The G Score in this study is not exactly defined as in Mohanram (2005), because one of 
Mohanram’s signals relates to advertising expenses and this data is not available from 
Datastream.  
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics for the whole sample and comparison of mean returns and 
fundamental characteristics of value and glamour stocks 
Variables Whole sample (13,761 firm-year observations)  Value vs. Glamour 
 Mean 
 
Median 
 
Maximum 
 
Minimum 
 Std. 
Dev.   Value Glamour Diff. t-stat 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) 
RR1 0.0967 0.0652 17.7276 -1 0.5632   0.1277 0.0641 0.0636 5.164*** 
Size 817 75 164,306 1 4,935   349 1259 -910 -8.885*** 
BM 0.6939 0.5038 29.8726 0.0004 0.7729  1.3379 0.2167 1.1212 72.458*** 
ROA 0.0391 0.0598 3.1256 -7.4569 0.2118   0.0161 0.0574 -0.0413 -8.678*** 
DROA 0.0228 -0.0021 200.6431 -9.2948 1.781  0.0045 0.023 -0.0185 -1.529 
CFO 0.0883 0.0924 80.9861 -5.8704 0.7179  0.0536 0.1059 -0.0523 -11.760*** 
ACCRUAL -0.0492 -0.0408 2.9193 -80.9592 0.706  -0.0375 -0.0485 0.0109 3.441*** 
DMARGIN 0.0431 0.0002 476.0476 -30.9205 4.2571  -0.0077 0.1451 -0.1528 -1.406 
DLIQUID 0.0019 -0.0013 50.9735 -57.9082 1.9695  0.063 -0.0576 0.1206 2.637*** 
DLEVER 0.0015 0 0.9944 -3.8576 0.1069  -0.0011 0.0015 -0.0026 -1.121 
DTURN -0.0288 -0.0059 7.1668 -12.9227 0.3406  -0.0315 -0.0128 -0.0187 -2.688*** 
CAPEX 0.0784 0.0511 28.3369 0 0.2609  0.0627 0.0865 -0.0238 -11.239*** 
RD 0.0198 0 1.7843 0 0.0719   0.0085 0.0347 -0.0261 -16.532*** 
F_ROA 0.8201 1 1 0 0.3841   0.7538 0.8434 -0.0896 -10.769*** 
F_DROA 0.4785 0 1 0 0.4996  0.4303 0.5245 -0.0942 -9.071*** 
F_CFO 0.8528 1 1 0 0.3543  0.8284 0.8571 -0.0288 -3.786*** 
F_ACCRUAL 0.7435 1 1 0 0.4367  0.7455 0.7314 0.014 1.531 
F_DMARGIN 0.5258 1 1 0 0.4994  0.496 0.5509 -0.0549 -5.272*** 
F_DLIQUID 0.4968 0 1 0 0.5  0.4975 0.4927 0.0048 0.459 
F_DLEVER 0.6234 1 1 0 0.4846  0.6251 0.6267 -0.0016 -0.156 
F_DTURN 0.4777 0 1 0 0.4995  0.4659 0.4973 -0.0314 -3.012*** 
EQOFFER 0.4357 0 1 0 0.4959  0.6028 0.3198 0.2831 28.362*** 
G_ROA 0.497 0 1 0 0.5  0.2517 0.6935 -0.4418 -47.264*** 
G_CFO 0.497 0 1 0 0.5  0.3115 0.6532 -0.3418 -34.856*** 
G_ROAVAR 0.4599 0 1 0 0.4984  0.4569 0.4298 0.0272 2.620*** 
G_SALESVAR 0.4595 0 1 0 0.4984  0.4554 0.4417 0.0137 1.316 
G_CAPEX 0.497 0 1 0 0.5  0.4113 0.5611 -0.1498 -14.513*** 
G_RD 0.3011 0 1 0 0.4588   0.2246 0.3633 -0.1387 -14.750*** 
F SCORE 5.4542 5 9 0 1.5729   5.4451 5.4437 0.0015 0.044 
G SCORE 3.4549 3 7 0 1.6664   2.8569 3.8741 -1.0172 -30.842*** 
Notes: 
Columns 2 to 6 present summary statistics using the whole sample. The last 4 columns compare 
mean raw returns and fundamental characteristics of value stocks with those of glamour stocks. 
Stocks in the highest BM tercile are value stocks and those in the lowest BM tercile are glamour 
stocks. Definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix. *, **, *** denotes significance at 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively, using a 2-tailed independent two-sample t-test. 
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Table 2 
Distribution of observations across F Score and G Score 
Panel A: Distribution of observations across F Score 
F Score n F Score Group N 
0 4 
Low F Score 1,513 
1 98 
2 351 
3 1,060 
4 2,156 
Medium F Score 8,630 5 3,215 
6 3,259 
7 2,346 
High F Score 3,618 8 1,048 
9 224 
Panel B: Distribution of observations across G Score 
G Score n G Score Group N 
0 305 
Low G Score 4,349 1 1,463 
2 2,581 
3 2,777 
Medium G Score 5,520 
4 2,743 
5 2,133 
High G Score 3,892 6 1,363 
7 396 
Notes: 
This table reports the number of firm-year observations grouped by F Score and G Score. Stocks with 
F Score from 0 to 3 (G Score from 0 to 2) are grouped into the low F Score (G Score) portfolio. Stocks 
with F Score from 4 to 6 (G Score from 3 to 4) are assigned to the medium F Score (G Score) 
portfolio. Stocks with F Score from 7 to 9 (G Score from 5 to 7) are assigned to the high F Score (G 
Score) portfolio. Definitions of F Score and G Score are provided in the Appendix. 
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Table 3 
Correlations between BM and the measures of firm’s financial strength 
  
F SCORE G SCORE BM 
F SCORE 1.0000     
G SCORE 0.2886*** 1.0000  
BM -0.0313*** -0.2000*** 1.0000 
Notes: 
This table reports the Pearson’s correlation coefficients between BM and the two measures of firm’s 
financial strengths (F Score and G Score). Definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix. 
*** denotes the coefficient is significant at 1% level. 
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Table 4 
Returns on the F Score and G Score strategies across value–glamour contexts 
  F Score   G Score 
  Value Neutral Glamour All   Value Neutral Glamour All 
Panel A: RR1 
Strong 0.1598 0.137 0.0987 0.1324   0.1596 0.1107 0.0789 0.1051 
Weak 0.0386 0.007 -0.021 0.0088   0.1125 0.0578 0.0244 0.0753 
Hedge 0.1212 0.1301 0.1198 0.1236  0.0471 0.0529 0.0545 0.0297 
   t-stat 4.552*** 4.058*** 2.588*** 7.210***  2.035** 2.699*** 1.909* 2.390** 
   Bootstrap p-value (0.010) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.006) (0.024) (0.052) 
Panel B: VMAR1 
Strong 0.0706 0.0474 -0.0044 0.0385   0.0825 0.0275 -0.0071 0.0217 
   t-stat 5.353*** 3.715*** -0.348 5.153***  4.591*** 2.832*** -0.763 3.382*** 
   Bootstrap p-value (0.006) (0.148) (0.068) (0.604)   (0.000) (0.768) (0.000) (0.056) 
Weak -0.0419 -0.056 -0.0746 -0.0572   0.0283 -0.0239 -0.051 -0.006 
   t-stat -1.841* -1.937* -1.711* -3.016***  1.984** -1.439 -1.937** -0.58 
   Bootstrap p-value (0.088) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000)   (0.052) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hedge 0.1125 0.1034 0.0701 0.0958  0.0542 0.0514 0.0439 0.0277 
   t-stat 4.276*** 3.273*** 1.545 4.695***  2.362** 2.670*** 1.57 2.267** 
   Bootstrap p-value (0.004) (0.004) (0.076) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.004) (0.106) (0.094) 
   Strong/Weak 
contribution (%) 
+
 
63/37 46/54 -6/106 
  
152/-52 54/46 -16/116 
 
Panel C: CFAR1 
Strong 0.0282 0.0696 0.0329 0.0433   0.0784 0.0246 0.0375 0.0398 
   t-stat 1.429 3.961*** 1.870* 4.081***  3.294*** 1.804** 2.782*** 4.443*** 
   Bootstrap p-value (0.062) (0.000) (0.104) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.19) (0.038) (0.000) 
Weak -0.0238 -0.0713 -0.1111 -0.0678   -0.0039 -0.0153 -0.0578 -0.0202 
   t-stat -0.775 -2.046** -1.717* -2.543**  -0.217 -0.723 -1.568 -1.473 
   Bootstrap p-value (0.51) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000)   (0.808) (0.234) (0.002) (0.026) 
Hedge 0.0519 0.1409 0.144 0.1111  0.0824 0.04 0.0953 0.0601 
   t-stat 1.425 3.610*** 2.147** 3.8714***  2.756*** 1.585 2.427** 3.663*** 
   Bootstrap p-value (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.074) (0.000) (0.000) 
   Strong/Weak 
contribution (%) 
+
 
54/46 49/51 23/77   95/5 62/38 39/61 54/46 
Notes: 
This table reports the one-year raw returns, market-adjusted returns and control-firm-adjusted returns 
on the strong, weak and hedge portfolios across value, neutral and glamour samples, and for the 
whole sample. Stocks with F Score from 0 to 3 (G Score from 0 to 2) are grouped into the weak 
portfolio and stocks with F Score from 7 to 9 (G Score from 5 to 7) are assigned to the strong 
portfolio. The hedge portfolios are those take long in strong stocks and short in weak stocks. Stocks in 
the highest BM tercile are value stocks, those in the lowest BM tercile are glamour stocks, and the 
rest are neutral. Definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix. *, **, *** means significant 
at 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. The t-statistics are from the 2-tailed t-tests under the null 
hypothesis that the portfolio returns are zero. The bootstrap p-values are estimated from 1,000 
iterations. 
+
 The contribution of the long positions relatively to the contributions of the short positions to the 
returns of the hedge portfolios.  
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Table 6 
Raw returns for F Score and G Score strategies across years 
  
Market 
condition 
G Score   F Score 
Year Strong Weak 
Strong-
Weak t-stat   Strong Weak 
Strong-
Weak t-stat 
1991 Good 0.2243 0.0397 0.1846 4.153***  0.1915 -0.0143 0.2058 2.956*** 
1992 Good 0.2095 0.2035 0.0060 0.114  0.2529 0.0590 0.1938 2.962*** 
1993 Good 0.0866 0.2419 -0.1553 -4.394***  0.2375 0.1303 0.1072 1.779* 
1994 Good 0.1090 -0.0312 0.1402 4.837***  0.0744 -0.0470 0.1214 2.789*** 
1995 Good 0.2148 0.2878 -0.0729 -1.694*  0.2779 0.2463 0.0315 0.443 
1996 Good 0.0042 0.0273 -0.0231 -0.746  0.0406 0.0088 0.0318 0.685 
1997 Good 0.2443 0.1062 0.1381 3.143***  0.2316 0.0707 0.1609 2.574** 
1998 Good -0.0006 -0.0156 0.0151 0.440  0.0190 -0.0496 0.0686 1.027 
1999 Good 0.1220 0.3297 -0.2076 -2.342***  0.1922 0.4964 -0.3042 -1.582 
2000 Bad 0.0545 -0.0256 0.0802 1.979**  0.0269 -0.1512 0.1780 2.882*** 
2001 Bad -0.0829 -0.1742 0.0913 2.383**  0.1073 -0.2767 0.3840 7.897*** 
2002 Bad 0.0137 -0.0879 0.1016 2.252**  -0.0052 -0.1414 0.1363 2.841*** 
2003 Good 0.3220 0.3509 -0.0289 -0.559  0.3294 0.2874 0.0421 0.716 
2004 Good 0.2117 0.1331 0.0786 1.838*  0.1788 0.0171 0.1617 2.414** 
2005 Good 0.1660 0.0681 0.0979 2.024**  0.1833 0.0233 0.1601 2.451** 
2006 Good 0.1949 0.1776 0.0172 0.278  0.1994 0.0917 0.1077 1.615 
2007 Bad -0.2320 -0.3595 0.1275 3.564***   -0.2583 -0.3649 0.1066 2.351** 
Notes: 
This table reports the one-year raw returns on the strong and weak portfolios. Stocks with F Score 
from 0 to 3 (G Score from 0 to 2) are grouped into the weak portfolio and stocks with F Score from 7 
to 9 (G Score from 5 to 7) are assigned to the strong portfolio. A “good” (“bad”) market is identified if 
the contemporary return on the FTSE All Shares Index is positive (negative). Definitions of the 
variables are provided in the Appendix. *, **, *** means significant at 10%, 5%, 1% levels, 
respectively. The t-statistics are from the 2-tailed independent two-sample t-test.  
 
  
 
